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A key question in development economics is the relation between a country's financial
system and its economic development. The empirical literature addressing this question has
focused on the role of banks and stock markets in providing the financing to the commercial
sector. This approach is motivated by the fact that in a perfectly functioning financial market the
financing should be from financial intermediaries and markets that specialize in the supply of
external finance.
In this paper, we broaden the focus and ask whether the state of development  of a
country's financial system and its legal system affect the provision of short-term capital by
corporations.
Even in well developed market economies, such as the United States, the supply of
capital is frequently bundled with the supply of goods, in the form of trade credit, and vendor
financing more generally. Lee and Stowe (1993) calculate that the amount of trade credit in 1985
"far exceeded the business lending of the entire banking system." Rajan and Zingales (1995)
present evidence that 18% of the total assets of US firms in 1991 consists of accounts receivable
-- funds loaned to customers. In countries such as Germany, France and Italy, trade credit
exceeds a quarter of total corporate assets.
While the use of trade credit is wide-spread, the reasons for its use is not well understood.
Much of the existing theoretical literature on trade credit has focused on explaining its use in
developed economies, such as that of the United States. The research question has been to
explain why it is efficient for non-financial corporations in a well developed market system to
act as financial intermediaries and advance credit when there exists a financial sector that already
specializes in the provision of capital.
1Several theoretical papers have analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of bank over
trade credit financing.' The literature has suggested that the trade credit (a) confers a product
market advantage on sellers who have access to capital --- especially in markets that are not
competitive; (b) allows superior allocation of credit when the financial system is not
informationally efficient; and (c) provides implicit guarantees to customers if the legal system is
sufficiently inefficient so that explicit guarantees are not credible. However, the existing
literature does not explore the role of trade credit in economic development.
Our focus is on exploring whether the use of trade credit between firms is a substitute for
borrowing from the financial intermediaries, or whether the use of trade credit is an efficient
complement to the lending by financial intermediaries. The latter might be the case if it is
efficient to have non-financial firms partially take on the role of financial intermediaries in
connection with transactions with which they are engaged in.
To examine the role of trade credit in the financial systems of developing countries we
will explore how the use of trade credit is related to the development of a country's banking
system and its legal infrastructure. Using firm-level data for 39 countries, the questions we seek
to answer are:
*  Is the use of trade credit greater in countries with inefficient legal systems?
*  Is the use of trade credit greater in countries with large banking systems?
*  How does the competitiveness and the concentration of the banking sector affect the
use of trade credit?
*  Do specific legal rules on repossession affect the use of trade credit?
' We discuss  the literature  on trade  credit  in the next section.
2The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We motivate our investigation in Section 2.
We discuss our data in Section 3 and our empirical design in Section 4. Section 5 contains
empirical results, Section 6 examines the robustness of our results, and Section 7 concludes.
2.0 THE MOTIVATION
The explanations of trade credit prevalent in the literature fall into one of two categories.
Several authors focus on the "business" motivations for trade credit, seeing it as a way to
minimize transactions cost  (Ferris 1981),  to allow firms to practice price discrimination
Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner (1988), and or to offer implicit quality guarantees (Lee and
Stowe (1993), Long, Malitz and Ravid (1993), Emery and Nayar (1994), and Deloof and Jegers
(1995).). Recently, Frank and Maksimovic (1998) argue that the legal system, at least under
common law, allows trade creditors to repossess their collateral more easily than financial
intermediaries.
A second category of explanations focuses on the "financial" aspects of trade credit.
Emery (1984) argues that when the borrowing and lending rates faced by firms differ, trade
credit can serve to arbitrage the difference.
Smith (1987) and Biais and Gollier (1997) argue that in the normal course of business a
seller obtains information about the true state of a buyer's business that is not known to financial
intermediaries. The latter may not have detailed knowledge of industry conditions and are forced
to rely excessively on accounting information. Since this information is potentially valuable,
seller acting on this information extend credit to buyers on terms that they would not be able to
receive from financial intermediaries.
Frank and Maksimovic (1998) have posited a direct mechanism to explain a relation
between the informational efficiency of the financial system and the use of trade credit. In their
3model, a supplier and a buyer access the financial system to obtain capital to fund a transaction.
As in the classic paper by Myers and Majluf (1984), external financing is costly because of
potential adverse selection in the market for capital. If the buyer faces greater adverse selection
risk, it is more efficient for the seller to obtain external financing and advance trade credit. By
contrast, if the buyer faces smaller adverse selection risk, it is more efficient for the buyer to
obtain external financing, and the purchase is a cash transaction. The model by Frank and
Maksimovic (1998) thus explains why a firm may extend trade credit to some customers, while
at the same time it also obtains trade credit from some of its suppliers.
The business and financial motivations for trade credit explored in the literature do not
imply direct predictions on the relative use of trade credit across countries. Moreover, the models
cannot be directly extended to yield unambiguous predictions about the prevalence of trade
credit financing across countries with different legal and financial systems. Thus, for example, to
the extent that explicit quality guarantees are hard to enforce in countries with inefficient legal
systems, one would expect more use of implicit quality guarantees that are created when firms
extend trade credit. However, in the absence of the ability to repossess goods, suppliers in
countries with inefficient legal systems may not be willing to supply goods on trade credit, and
may require cash payments. This suggests that there may be less use of trade cre(lit  for the
purpose of providing implicit guarantees in countries with less efficient legal systems. Which of
those effects predominates depends on the relative reputation of the buyer and the seller, and this
may differ across countries.
The traditional financial theories of trade credit also yield ambiguous predictions. They
suggest that the relative use of trade credit is lower in financial systems that are more efficient in
acquiring and processing information. The trade credit theories themselves, however, do not
4predict whether a concentrated or a dispersed, and therefore more competitive,  banking system is
superior in financing transactions which firms would otherwise finance on trade credit.
The review of the existing literature suggests two broad approaches to the use of trade
credit, which we term "the substitution hypothesis" and the "complementarity hypothesis."
The Substitution Hypothesis
The substitution hypothesis holds that trade credit is a substitute for financing by
financial intermediaries. Reliance on trade credit is likely to be highest in countries where
financial systems are undeveloped. In that case it is likely that potential borrowers are
constrained from access to capital, and they will turn to substitute sources of financing, in
particular non-financial corporations. In this sense, trade credit and bank credit are substitutes,
and trade credit is expected to be used more heavily in countries with undeveloped financial
systems. Since financial contracts are more likely to be enforceable in countries with efficient
legal systems that guarantee creditor rights, the substitution hypothesis predicts a negative
relation between the efficiency of the legal system and the use of credit. For the same reason, the
use of trade credit by firms is expected to be negatively related to the specific protections
captured in Laporta, Lopez-De-Silanes,  Shleifer, and Vishny's (1998) creditor rights index.
The Complementarity Hypothesis
While it may seem natural to conclude that borrowers are likely to view bank and trade
credit as substitutes,  the supply of trade credit may be greater if supplying firms have access to
bank loans. Moreover, following Biais and Gollier (1997) and Frank and Maksimovic (1998), the
use trade credit may be viewed as complementary with financing by financial intermediaries.
Firms obtain capital from financial intermediaries and financial markets. For transactions where
direct monitoring by financial intermediaries is efficient, financial intermediaries and markets
5provide capital directly to firms. However, in cases where suppliers are more efficient at
monitoring, or in enforcing contracts, it may be optimal for financial intermediaries to lend to
suppliers, who then relend to the buying firms. Such efficiencies may arise because suppliers
have proprietary information about buyers, because they can threaten to suspend 9uture
deliveries,  or because they have a higher opportunity cost of any repossessed inventory than do
financial intermediaries.
In this view we would expect the total amount of trade credit to be positively related to
the amount of lending to the private sector by financial intermediaries.  The use ol trade credit is
also greater if the financial intermediaries are inefficient at monitoring private borrowers and
enforcing loan contracts. These inefficiencies can arise in several ways. In some countries there
exist legal restrictions on the ability of intermediaries  to enter into optimal contracts with
borrowers. Thus, for example, restrictions on owning stock in, or controlling, non-financial
corporations may prevent banks from optimally safeguarding their loans in instances where
borrowers become financially distressed. The possibility of such outcomes may make it efficient
for banks to make some of their loans indirectly, by lending to a firm's suppliers, who then
relend the funds through trade credit. Thus, we would expect a positive relation between the use
of trade credit and the existence of restrictions on bank ownership of equity securities. Other
potential sources of inefficiency are the use of the the banking system to achieve non-economic
goals or monopolistic practices.
In summary, the 'complementary view' holds that the use of trade credit is greater in
countries which have a large and efficient system of financial intermediaries. In such systems
non-financial corporations act as 'agents' for financial intermediaries. They lend and borrow
from other corporations when they have a comparative advantage in enforcing those contracts,
6and borrow from financial intermediaries  when the latter's advantage  of access to funds and
monitoring ability are sufficiently great. Thus, we would expect a large intermediary sector to be
associated with the use of more trade credit. Holding size constant, factors that reduce the
competitiveness of the banking sector, such as restrictions on stock ownership or high
concentration, should increase the use of trade credit. The role of the legal variables is more
ambiguous. To the extent that an efficient legal system benefits financial intermediaries,  we
would expect a negative relation between the quality of the legal system and the use of trade
credit, holding the size of the intermediary sector constant.
The Empirical Design
In order to explore the empirical validity of the two views of the relation between the
financial system and intermediation by firms, we address the following questions:
First, we wish to find out whether there is a relation between the level of development of
a country's financial system and the use of trade credit. The financial theories above suggest the
existence of a negative relation.
Second, we wish to investigate whether there is a relation between the effectiveness  of
the legal system and the use of trade credit.
Third, we examine whether specific characteristics of the financial system affect the use
of trade credit. In particular, we focus on the effect of state ownership, the concentration of the
banking sector, and of the restrictions on banks' ownership of nonfinancial corporations on the
use of trade credit.
Fourth, we investigate the role of legal origins and specific legal provisions, such as the
ability to repossess assets on the use of trade credit.
73. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
3.1 Description of Sample
The firm-level data consist of financial statements for the largest publicly traded
manufacturing firrns in 40 countries (SIC codes 2000-3999). Our sample of firms contains
45,598 annual observations over the period 1989-1996.  The sample is from Worldscope and
contains data from both developed and developing countries as listed in Table Al in the
Appendix. For each of the countries we also use data on financial system development compiled
by Beck, Demirgu,c-Kunt  and Levine (1999).
In Table 1 we present pertinent facts about the level of economic and institutional
development in the sample countries. The countries in the sample exhibit a great deal of
variation in development level, economic conditions, and institutional arrangements. They range
from Switzerland, with average per capita gross domestic product in 1990 dollars of $27,157 to
Pakistan, with a per capita income of $302. The countries also vary in the amount of inflation,
from a low average rate of 2 percent per year in the case of Japan, up to 234 percent in the case
of Brazil.
We use several descriptors of a country's banking system. Our principal measure of the
general development of the banking sector, PRIVATE/GDP, is the ratio of the claims on the
private sector by deposit money banks to the GDP. The average value of this ratio during our
sample period ranges from 0.06 in the case of Peru, to 1.63 in the case of Switzerland. 2 Countries
2 Beck,  Demirguc-Kunt  and Levine  (2000)  discuss this measure  of financial  system  development.
8with a large banking sector include Japan, Germany and Hong Kong, whereas Mexico, Turkey
and Columbia have small banking sectors relative to their GDP.
We also include several more specialized descriptors of each country's banking system.
Laporta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  and Shleifer (1999) find that the extent of public ownership of a
country's banking system is a proxy of the banking system's efficiency in financing the private
sector. Thus, we would expect state ownership to be a potential determinant of the use of trade
credit. One the one hand, inefficient loan policies will direct lending away from the most
efficient uses, and provide incentives for the use of trade credit to reallocate capital to the most
productive uses. On the other hand, to the extent that lending by state banks is politically  driven
and is not driven by commercial considerations, state banks may be willing to direct inefficient
loans to enterprises, reducing their need to rely on credit. Which of these effects predominates is
an empirical question.
We use their measure of public ownership, PUBLIC, which is the proportion of assets of
the ten largest banks in each country owned by the government. The proportion varies from zero,
in the case of several countries, such as Australia and Belgium, to 0.8 in the case of Indonesia.
Inefficiencies in lending to corporations may arise because of the structure of the
financial internediaries. For example, if the banks are highly concentrated, then they may be
able to use their market power to extract value from some categories of borrowers. Such
borrowers may then find it optimal to obtain financing at the margin from non-financial firms in
the form of trade credit. However, a concentrated banking system also makes it more likely that
financial intermediaries have banking relationships with both the buyer and the seller, as well as
other firms in their industries. This multiplicity of relationships may provide banks in
9concentrated financial systems with information  advantages that offset the knowledge of
customer possessed by sellers.
The countries in our sample also vary in the extent to which their banking ,ystems are
concentrated. Our indicator of concentration, CONCENTRATION,  measures the three largest
banks' assets to the total assets of the banking sector. The ratio is lowest for the Ulnited  States, at
0.18, and highest in the case of Sweden, at 0.89.
Banking systems vary in the extent to which banks are to own and control nonfinancial
firms. Such restrictions are significant because they affect the ability of banks to enter into
optimal contracts with non-financial borrowers. Barth, Caprio and Levine (1999) build an index
that measures such restrictions.  We use this index, REST, in which 1 indicates "unrestricted," 2
indicates "permitted," 3 indicates "restricted," and 4 indicates "prohibited."
Following Laporta, Lopez-De-Silanes,  Shleifer and Vishny (1998), several recent studies
have argued that the efficiency of the legal system is an important determinant of the availability
of external financing (e.g., Demirgu,-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998). All types of borrowing,
including trade credit, are facilitated by legally enforceable commitments to repay the loan.
Thus, one might expect the amount of trade credit to be positively related to the efficiency of a
country's legal system. However, the efficiency of the legal system is likely to have a greater
effect on lending by financial intermediaries than on suppliers of trade credit. Th.s is because
trade creditors may be able to punish debtors without resort to the legal system by withholding
further deliveries. This substitution effect suggests that the supply of trade credit is negatively
related to the efficiency of the legal system. In a regression of the use of trade credit that includes
both the size of the banking system and the efficiency of the legal system as independent
variables, the coefficient of legal efficiency variable will pick up the substitution effect. Thus, we
10expect the use of trade credit, controlling for the size of the banking system, to be negatively
related to the efficiency of the legal system.
As an indicator of the ability of firms to enter into financial contracts we use a
commercial index of experts' evaluations of the efficiency of the state in enforcing  property
rights within each country. This measure, LAW & ORDER, produced by the International
Country Risk rating agency, reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to
accept the established institutions to make and  implement laws and adjudicate disputes. It is
scored on a zero to six scale, with higher scores indicating sound political institutions and a
strong court system. Lower scores indicate a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal
means to settle claims. This indicator has been used in previous studies comparing institutions in
different countries (e.g.,  Knack and Keefer 1995, Demirgiiu-Kunt  and Maksimovic 1998).
Another potential determinant of the use of trade credit is the extent to which firms'
creditors possess the right to safeguard their claims in the event that the firm fails to meet its
obligations. However, while the existence of strong creditor rights facilitates the writing of
enforceable  contracts both by financial intermediaries and by trade creditors, it is not clear
whether the strong rights leads to relatively more or less use of trade credit.  In countries with
strong creditor rights, financial intermediaries are more willing to provide financing to firms,
which are, in turn, able to offer trade credit to their customers. However, strong creditor rights
also facilitate direct lending by banks to customers. Thus, net effect of a high creditor rights
score on the amount trade credit depends on which of two effects predominates.
We also investigate the relation between creditor rights and trade financing using the
Creditor Rights Index compiled by Laporta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998).
The variable CREDITOR RIGHTS is an index that ranges from 0 to 4 and aggregates creditor
11rights in the following way: (1) the country imposes restrictions, such as creditors' consent or
minimum dividends to file for reorganization; (2) secured creditors are able to ga:in  possession
of their security once the reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3)
secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the
disposition of assets of a bankrupt firm; and (4) the debtor does not retain the adrministration  of
its property pending the resolution of the reorganization.
While in principle the extent of creditor rights are important in determining a firm's
ability to borrow, an index of specific legal protections, such as CREDITOR  RIGHTS, that may
not fully proxy for the underlying differences between countries. A comparison of specific rights
across countries does not take into account the fact that firms may be able to compensate for the
absence of specific legal protections by altering the provisions of contracts. By contrast, it is
likely to be more difficult to compensate for the systemic failures of the legal system to
adjudicate claims captured by the law and order indicator. In Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic
(1999), we show that the index is a good predictor of the use of long-term debt by large firms in
our sample of countries. We found less evidence that the indicators of specific legal protections
identified by Laporta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) predict the use of long-
term debt. As result, we place more weight on the LAW & ORDER indicator than.  on the
comparison of specific differences in the legal codes across countries in CREDITOR RIGHTS.
The origin of a country's legal system is believed to be an important deteiminant of
whether the legal system facilitates firms' access to external finance (Laporta, Lopez-De-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny 1998, Demirguic-Kunt  and Maksimovic 1998, 1999). Systems based on
common law are considered to offer better protection to external financiers. However, the
existing literature primarily focuses on the additional protections common law systems provide
12to direct investors. The literature does not analyze the comparative advantage  of common law or
civil law systems in providing protections to creditors who are also suppliers. Thus, effect of
legal origin on the amount of trade credit is an empirical question.
Our COMMON LAW Dummy takes the value one for common law countries and the
value zero for others. As argued by Laporta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998),
common law legal systems are more likely to offer protections to outside investors than civil law
systems.
Table 1 shows that our sample contains countries with legal systems of very diverse
levels of effectiveness. It contains highly effective common law legal systems (such as the
United States and Canada) and less effective legal systems (such as India and Pakistan), as well
as highly effective civil systems (such as Switzerland) and less effective systems such as those in
Columbia and Peru.3
4. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
Trade credit is granted by the sellers to the purchasers of merchandize. Normally, the
grant of trade credit is related to the sale of specific items and is granted on a short-term basis.
The seller normally either allows the buyer to delay payment  for a specified number of days, or
offers the purchaser the choice of delaying payment or settling for cash immediately and taking a
"cash discount." 4
3 Our sample of countries does not contain economies with very weak banking systems and legal infrastructure, such
as those in early stages of transition between communism and capitalism. Thus, our findings may not generalize to
such economies.
4The  terms of the contracts may vary by industry and by the creditworthiness of the parties involved.  In the United
States a popular credit contract gives the  purchaser the choice of taking a two percent cash discount if the account is
settled within ten days, or delaying payment for thirty days.
13In this paper, we use two standard measures of trade financing used by financial
analysts. 5 The commonly used measure of extended credit is Receivables Turnover, RECTURN,
defined as the Total Sales, divided by the Accounts Receivable. More precisely, RECTURN in
year t is computed by dividing a corporation's total sales by the average of its Accounts
Receivables at the end of year t and at the end of year t-1. A high measure indicates that the
credit a firm is extending to customers is a small proportion of total sales. This may occur if the
firm only extends credit for a short period, or if it extends longer termn  credit to only a fraction of
its customers.
The extent to which a firm borrows from its suppliers is measured by Payables Turnover,
PAYTURN. PAYTURN in year t is computed by dividing a as the ratio of total cost of goods
sold, divided by the average of its Accounts Payable at the end of year t and at the end of year t-
1. A high value of PAYTURN indicates that a firm does not borrow much from its suppliers in
order to directly finance purchases of its inputs.
The variables RECTURN and PAYTURN measure how the firm finances the flow of
output shipped to customers, and the flow of inputs received from its suppliers, respectively.
Although RECTURN and PAYTURN are commonly used by finance practitioners, they differ
from the familiar ratio measures of leverage used in corporate finance research. T  hese ratio
measures are typically computed by dividing the value of line item, such as short-term debt, on a
firm's balance sheet by its total assets or total equity. While these measures are appropriate for
studying some corporate finance policy decisions, such as the capital structure decision, they do
not directly measure the use of trade credit, which primarily finances sales and purchases, not
long-term assets. Furthermore, in a cross-country analysis measures that are computed by
5 The measures  we use are described  in most  standard  finance  textbooks.  See, for example,  Ross,  Westerfield,  and
14comparing contemporaneous  variables, such as receivables and sales, are less likely to be subject
to measurement error than measures that rely on the accurate measurement of a stock variable,
such as total assets.
A firm that needs to obtain short-term financing of its purchases can, in principle, obtain
the financing either directly from the seller, or from other sources, such as a financial institution
or market for commercial  paper. The firms in our sample comprise the largest manufacturing
firms in their respective countries. By virtue of the fact that they have attracted the attention of
Worldscope these firms are likely to be less financially constrained than other firms in their
industries. As a result, they are more likely to act as financial intermediaries than other firms in
the sample.
We measure the extent to which the firm relies on the financial system by the ratio of
short-term debt to accounts payable. A high ratio indicates that the firm obtains most of its credit
from the financial system.
Figures 1-3 show how the average values of PAYTURN, RECTURN and STD/ACCTS.
PAYABLE vary by country. As Figure 1 shows, firms in Pakistan, Brazil, and Peru have the
highest receivables turnover, whereas firms in Italy, Greece, France and Japan have the lowest
turnover. Thus, the initial evidence does not support the notion that trade financing is used as a
substitute for other types of financing by firms in countries with underdeveloped banking
systems. This finding is strengthened by evidence on level of between payables turnover in
Figure 2. As Figure 2 shows, firms in Italy, Japan, Luxemburg and France are among the largest
users of trade credit. By contrast, firms in Brazil, Malaysia, and Pakistan have the highest
payables turnover.
Jordan (1999).
15Consistent with these findings, Figure 3 shows firms in Canada, US, Ireland, and the
United Kingdom are heavy users of trade credit relative to short-term  debt, whereas firms in
developing economies such as Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, and Pakistan rely more heavily on
bank financing.
Figures 1 to 3 suggest that trade credit is not a form of financing that substitutes for bank
financing in cases where the firms are credit rationed by the financial system. Inst-,ad,  consistent
with Frank and Maksimovic (1998), lending by non-financial firms may be an efficient method
of allocating credit even in countries with relatively effective financial systems. In order to
determine whether any specific characteristics of firms or countries' financial systems affect the
propensity to use trade credit, we proceed to multivariate analysis.
Table II contains the sample statistics of the variables we consider. In addition to the
variables discussed above, we also control for two macro-economic and three potential firm-
specific deterninants of trade credit use.
We also include two macroeconomic variables that have been found by Demirguc-Kunt
and Maksimovic (1998, 1999) to predict the use of external finance: the rate of inflation and the
growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product. The rate of inflation may proxy for willingness to
enter into long-term financial contracts that may be a substitute for short-term trade credit. Firms
in fast growing economies may have a higher demand for credit than firms in economies that are
not expanding.
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) find that firm size is an important determinant of
cross-country differences in the use of long-term financing. Small firms in both developed and
developing countries rely primarily of short-term financing, whereas large firms in more
developed economies use more long-term debt than large firms in developing financial systems.
16Thus, in our multivariate analysis we control for firm size by calculating SIZE, the ratio of a
firm's total assets by the GDP of its country.
Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Booth, Aivazian, Demirguic-Kunt  and Maksimovic (2001)
show that the use of debt by firms in a sample of developed and developing countries is
negatively related to their profitability. This finding is consistent with findings on the relation
between reported profitability and leverage in the US by Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984).
Accordingly, we control for the return on equity, ROE, of each firm in our sample.
Finally, the use of trade credit may depend on a firm's capital intensity, NSNFA, which
we measure by the ratio of a firm's net sales to its net fixed assets. This relation can arise
because net fixed assets may serve as collateral for long-term loans. Thus, firms that have a low
ratio of net sales to net fixed assets may be able to obtain a large quantity of long-term financing
relative to their sales and purchases. Such firms may be able to extend a large quantity of credit
to their customers (thus, they will have a low RECTURN ratio) and may not need to obtain credit
from their own suppliers (thus, they will have a high PAYTURN ratio). Demirguic-Kunt  and
Maksimovic (1999) find that NSNFA predicts the use of short-term debt by firms.
Panel B of Table II shows the correlation matrix for the variables in our study. There is a
high and significant correlation between RECTURN and PAYTURN: firms that obtain trade
credit also extend trade credit to their own customers. This relation may arise in two ways. First,
firms that have trouble collecting from their own customers may be forced to delay paying their
suppliers. Alternatively, granting and accepting trade credit may be an efficient means of using
allocating credit in the economy. There exists a negative relation between RECTURN and
RATIO, suggesting that firms which extend a large amount of trade credit also borrow relatively
less from banks than firms.
17There is a negative relation between GDP/CAP and both RECTURN and PAYTURN,
suggesting that firms in developed countries rely more on trade financing than firms in less
developed countries. High growth is associated with more use of trade financing relative to the
level of transactions (i.e., lower PAYTURN and RECTURN). However economic growth is also
associated with more reliance on short-term debt relative to the use of accounts receivable. By
contrast, high rates of inflation are associated with less use of trade credit.
A large banking sector, as measured by PRIVATE/GDP, is associated by greater use of
trade credit to finance transactions between firms. Thus, the use of trade credit is complementary
to the use of bank financing. By contrast, ownership of the banking sector by the government is
associated with less use of trade credit and more reliance on short-term debt.
The relation between the use of trade credit and restrictions on bank ownership of non-
financial firms and of the concentration of the financial sector is more difficult to interpret. In
our sample, firrns in countries with concentrated banking sectors tend to extend less trade credit
to their customers, they appear to use relatively more trade credit themselves. By contrast, in
countries where banks face restrictions in the ownership of non-financial corporations, firms
extend more trade credit but take less.
This asymmetry in the association between the characteristics of the banking system and
PAYTIIRN and RECTURN may occur because the firms in our sample comprise the largest
corporations in their respective countries. Such firms are most likely to act as intermediaries
between the financial sector and the buyers of their products in the manner suggested by Frank
and Maksimovic (1998). Thus, for example, when there exist restrictions on the ownership of
non-financial corporations by banks, banks may be less likely to lend directly to smaller firms.
Instead they may lend more to the larger firms in the economy (i.e., the positive and significant
18relation between REST and RATIO). These larger firms may finance smaller firns (i.e., the
negative and significant relation between REST and RECTURN) and take less trade credit from
these smaller firms themselves (i.e., the positive and significant  relation between REST and
PAYTURN).
There is significant association between the efficiency of country's legal system and the
use of trade credit. In countries with efficient legal systems, firms rely less on trade credit to
finance transactions. This contrasts sharply with results for the relation between GDP/CAP and
the use of trade credit reported above, despite the high correlation  between the efficiency of a
country's legal system and GDP/CAP. Interestingly, the negative correlation between the
efficiency of the legal system and RATIO suggests an even smaller use of short-term bank credit
to finance transactions in countries with good legal systems.
Creditor protection is positively related to both to the use of trade credit and to short-term
borrowing from banks. By contrast, firms in common law countries tend to lend less to other
firms and to engage in less short-term borrowing from banks, perhaps because financial markets
are better developed in such countries.
Taken together, the simple correlations between the legal variables and the measures of
the use of trade credit suggest that efficient legal systems lead to less reliance on short-term
financing. 6 By contrast, specific strong creditor protections lead to more short-term financing,
both by banks and by non-financial firms.
Turning to firm-specific variables, high return on equity, high ratio of sales to fixed assets
and large size is significantly associated with less trade credit financing of transactions (higher
RECTURN and PAYTURN).
6 This is consistent with the findings of Denirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999).
19In sum, the simple correlations reported in Table II, Panel B indicate that there exist
statistically significant  relations between the use of credit and the suggested explanatory
variables. However, the panel also indicates that there is a high degree of correlation between
many of the suggested determinants. To reach a more definitive conclusion we need to control
for these correlations.
The regression equations we estimate are of the form:
y = Po  +  PI  NSNFA + (32 ROE +,B3  SIZE +P4GROWTH +  35  INFLATION  -
(3 6GDP/CAP  + (37  PRIVATE/GDP  +  (8  PUBLIC + 09 CONCENTRATION  + (3lo  REST+ PII
LAW  & ORDER +  312 CREDITOR RIGHTS + P13  COMMON-LAW  DUMMY + c,.
For each dependent variable we present two specifications. The first specification is
estimated using firm level pooled data over the 1989-1996  period using firm and year random
effects. 7 The use of firm-level random effects is a conservative estimation procedure, in that
some of the differences in the use of trade credit by firms in different financial systems may be
picked up by the firm-level effect. An alternative procedure is to use industry-level random
effects, thereby implicitly assuming that  the differences in the use of trade credit by firms in the
same industry are not caused by unobserved firm-level heterogeneity across countries. We have
also estimated a pooled regression using an industry-level  random effect (at the four-digit SIC
code level). We do not report these results because they are similar to those reported in Table
III. However, we note any material differences below. To address the possibility that our
independent variables primarily explain cross-sectional variations in the data, a second
specification is estimated using cross-sectional firm level data averaged over the sample period.
7Moulton  (1987) shows that random effects are more likely to yield consistent estimates than fixed effects
estimators when variables are subject to measurement error.
20The three dependent variables of interest: PAYTURN,  RECTURN and STD/ACCTS.
PAYABLE are heavily skewed. Since our analytical framework  does not predict the precise
functional form, we analyze the variables transformed by taking natural logarithms. 8 This
transformation induces a more symmetrical distribution of the dependent variables.
Previous cross-country studies of financing choices by Demirgiiu-Kunt and Maksimovic
(1996, 1998, and 1999) have found different financing patterns for small and large firms.
Petersen and Rajan (1997) find that firm size is important in explaining trade credit flows in the
US.  Accordingly we report our results separately for large and small firms. Each year firms are
classified as large or small, depending on whether their sales exceed or are below the sales of the
median firm in our sample from that country.
5.0 RESULTS
5.1 The Financing of Sales
Panel A of Table III shows how the amount lent to customers, RECTURN depends on
country and firm-specific variables. The table reveals that the amount of trade credit extended by
both large and small firms depends on both the characteristics of the financial system and on the
legal systems of the countries.
Firms extend more trade credit in countries with larger banking systems, as measured by
PRIVATE/GDP: The coefficient of PRIVATE/GDP is negative and highly significant across all
specifications,  for both large and small firms. These results suggest that the financing of sales
using trade credit by firms in our sample complements the existence of a well functioning
banking sector, as suggested by Frank and Maksimovic (1998) and Biais and Gollier (1997).
8 The use of raw data results in similar findings, albeit with a lower explanatory power.
21The coefficients of the other banking variables and the legal variables lend support to this
conclusion. Receivables turnover is lower in countries where banks are restricted from
controlling non-financial firms. There exists evidence of a negative relation between the
proportion of the banking sector owned by the state and the provision of trade credit by firms.
This relation may arise if publicly funded banks do not make economically  rationale loans, either
by not lending enough to firms that can efficiently relend to their customers, or by making
inefficient loans to directly to customers, thereby displacing efficient provision of trade credit.
We investigate these possibilities further below.
By contrast, the concentration of the banking system, does not appear to be consistently
related to the provision of trade credit to finance sales in our sample. In cross-section,  large firms
extend more credit in countries with concentrated legal systems. However, this eff'ect  is reversed
in the panel.
The efficiency of a country's legal system is positively related to receivables turnover.
Thus, in countries with efficient legal systems suppliers lend, on average, for a shorter period.
This suggests that, controlling for the magnitude of bank lending extended to the private sector,
an efficient legal system favors direct lending by banks to finance purchases over financing of
goods sold by sellers.
The coefficients for common law dummy are significant across the specifications and the
two size categories. Less trade credit used in common law countries. By contrast, evidence on
the relation between creditor rights and RECTURN is mixed.
Inspection of the coefficients of the control variables shows that high rates of inflation are
associated with an unwillingness to extend credit. By contrast, economy-wide growth is
associated with increased willingness to extend trade credit.
22More profitable firms extend less trade credit than less profitable firms. While this
finding appears across specifications, its provenance is unclear. It may be that, as suggested by
Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner (1988), trade credit is used to provide price breaks to
marginal customers. In that case, other things being equal, large accounts receivable balances
would indicate that a large fraction of the firm's customer base has a low valuation for its
product. Such firms are likely to be unprofitable.
The remaining two control variables, NSNFA and SIZE are significant in some
specifications only. There is limited evidence that for large firms there exists a negative relation
between NSNFA and the financing of sales. SIZE  appears to be positively related to receivables
turnover.
In sum, large banking systems that are restricted from owning non-financial corporations
are associated with the provision of trade credit. In countries with an efficient legal systems and
in common law countries firms lend less to their customers. Large and profitable firms lend less
to their customers. Firms in rich, growing economies, with low rates of inflation lend more.
5.2 The Financing of Purchases
Panel B of Table III shows how the amount borrowed from suppliers, PAYTURN
depends on country and firm-specific variables. As revealed in Panel B, the estimates are
consistent with the results on receivables in Panel A.
There exists a highly significant positive relation between the PRIVATE/GDP and
borrowing on credit. Trade payables are higher when banks are restricted in their ability to own
stock in nonfinancial corporations. Public ownership of banks is associated with less, rather than
more, borrowing on trade credit.
23Holding the banking system's loans to the private sector constant, trade payables are
lower when the legal system is efficient. There is also evidence that firms in countries whose
legal system has a common law origin have lower amounts of payables.
Taken together these results are consistent with the complementarity hypoiheses: firms in
countries with large, private banking systems borrow more from non-financial intermediaries.
Holding the financial system constant, firms in countries with efficient legal systems, particularly
of common law origin, borrow less from their suppliers.
Focusing on the control variables, there is a positive relation between ROE and
borrowing on trade credit. Similarly, payables are lower when the inflation rate is high.
Similarly,  when the ratio of net sales to net fixed assets is high, firms finance a smaller
proportion of their purchases on trade credit.
The coefficient of GDP/CAP is negative and highly significant in most specifications,
indicating that firms in more developed countries rely more on trade credit to finance their
purchases than firms in less developed countries, even after controlling for our financial and
legal variables. This finding suggests that there are other relevant differences in financial systems
between countries that are correlated with development but have not been captured by our
banking and legal variables. 9
In the large firm sample, firm size is not related to the use of trade credit :o finance
purchases. For small firms there is a negative relation. While it is possible to provide an
economic  rationale for the finding that the smallest and the largest firms rely more on trade credit
than mid-size firms (smallest firms have no choice, whereas the largest firms may have the
bargaining power to use late payment of accounts as a form of favorable price discrimination),
24the finding is nevertheless unexpected. However, it is not robust to the alternative specification
of the random error below.
5.3 The use of Short Term Debt and Accounts Payables by Firms
Short-term debt and accounts payable are alternative forms of external financing. In this
sub-section we investigate the determinants of the choice between them. Our dependent variable
is RATIO, the log of the ratio of the firm's short-term debt to accounts payable. As in previous
panels, we present both panel and cross-sectional results.
Firms in countries with large and concentrated banking sectors borrow relatively more
from banks than from their suppliers. For smaller firms, extensive public ownership of banks
also leads to a higher values of RATIO. 10
In countries with legal systems of common law origin there is a relatively higher degree
of reliance on accounts payable than on bank credit. However, this heavier reliance on trade
credit cannot be explained by arguing that common law gives creditors greater protection or is
associated with more efficient legal systems. In countries with higher creditor rights protection,
firms borrow more from banks then from their suppliers, suggesting that the enforcement of
trade credit contracts relies more on informal mechanisms. The efficiency of the legal system is
associated with a greater use of short-term debt by large firms.
9 Demirguic-Kunt  and Maksimovic (1998) show that the level of activity of the stock market and the level of
government intervention in the economy are both predictors of the use of external financing.
10  Interestingly, restrictions on bank ownership of non-financial corporations are associated with higher values of
RATIO. As Panels A and B of Table III indicate, these restrictions are associated with more borrowing and lending
on trade credit. These results, together with the finding that restrictions lead to higher values of RATIO, suggest
that firms in banking systems with restrictions have a higher usage of trade credit financing, but that their reliance
on short-term  bank debt is relatively higher. It is likely that in countries where banks are constrained there is a
substitution  from bank to trade credit financing  (this consistent with Panels A and B). Relatively heavier reliance on
bank financing over accounts payable may occur if the publicly traded firms in this sample are conduit for short-
term funds the banking sector to the non-financial corporations.
25Firm  profitability is negatively associated with RATIO, suggesting that profitable firms
cut their bank borrowing more than their accounts payable borrowing. Firm size is positively
related to RATIO, suggesting that size plays a larger role in access to bank financing than trade
credit. Short-term bank financing plays a relatively less significant role than trade credlit
financing in economies that are growing fast, are experiencing  inflation, and have higher level of
income per capita. This last finding suggests that there that trade credit financing is nct an
adaptation for obtaining finance in the absence of a formal banking sector, but is high'ly  prevalent
in developed economies.
5.4 Industry  Composition  and Trade  Credit
The results in Table III are derived using an estimator that takes into account firm-specific
differences in the use of trade financing by using a firm-specific random component. This may
understate the role of legal and financial variables because the selection of firms that operate in
an economy may itself be a function of the economy's institutions. An alternative specification,
is to estimate the specification that replace the firm-level random effects by industry-level
random effects. This is line the findings by Ng, Smith and Smith (1999) who document wide
variation in the credit terms across industries but little variation within industries.
In unreported regressions we have also tested the specification using industry-level
random effects. In this specification the error component takes into account differences in the use
of trade financing by firms in different industries, but takes those differences as being constant
across all countries. The results of the new specification are broadly similar. The principal
differences are as follows: In the receivables regressions the Creditor Rights variable is now
positive and significant in both the large-firm and small-firm equations. Size is also positive and
significant in the large firm equation.  In the PAYTURN regression, the Creditor Rights variable
26is now not significant in either the small or large equation. Size is again positive and significant
in the large firm equation. In the RATIO equation, Law and Order is now positive and significant
in the small-firm equation.
Thus, this alternative specification gives additional support to our principal conclusions.
We find that a strong the legal infrastructure -- an efficient legal system and the guarantee of
investor rights --- tends to reduce the use of trade credit (both payable and receivable) for all size
firms. When the legal infrastructure is weak, more intermediation is performed by firms. There is
also evidence that the smaller firms give and receive more trade credit.
6.0 SENSITIVITY  ANALYSIS
The specification in Table III is designed to test the hypothesis that trade credit is a
complement to the banking system as a channel by which short-term financing is allocated to
non-financial corporations. The extent of such compelementarity  depends on the characteristics
of the banking system and legal systems. The right hand side variables in our regressions proxy
for characteristics identified in the corporate finance literature as being relevant.
Inspection of Panel B, Table II, reveals that many of the explanatory variables are highly
correlated with each other, and that some may be themselves endogenous. Thus, for example,
Demirgiiu-Kunt  and Maksimovic (1999, 2000) argue that the size of the banking system depends
on the quality and origin of a country's legal system, and on the protection of creditor rights.
While Table III reveals regularities in the data, causal interpretations based on the equations
must be treated with caution.
To check whether our results are sensitive to the endogeneity of the banking system, we
reestimated the specification in Table III, replacing PRIV by its predicted value. This predicted
value is itself estimated using variables more likely to be exogenous
27Predicted values are derived from the following first stage equation:
PRTV/GDP = yo  + y, GROWTH  + Y2  INFLATION  +  y3GDP/CAP +y4 LAW & ORDER +
35 CREDITOR  RIGHTS  +  (6  COMMON-LAW  DUMMY  + c.
We repeat our specification of Table III, dropping the creditor rights variable in order to
ensure that the system is identified. In the interest of brevity, only cross-sectional results are
reported in Table TV,  for large and small firms separately. Results using panel estimation
techniques are similar.
For the variables of interest, the results obtained using the two-stage procedure are mostly
consistent with those reported in Table III. An efficient legal system leads to less reliance on
trade credit, with no increase in the relative use of bank debt. In common law countries there is
less reliance on trade credit than in other countries. However, there is an even smalIkr  reliance
on short-tern bank debt.
A large banking system is associated with greater use of receivables and payables.
However, a large banking system is also associated with a greater use of short-term debt relative
to payables by the firms in our sample. Public ownership of the banking system reduces the use
of trade credit, and promotes the reliance on short-term debt by the smaller firms in our sample.
The results on concentration are more mixed. In concentrated banking systenms,  large
firms lend less to other firms and borrow a little more from them. Their use of short-term debt
relative to accounts payable financing is not affected. Under the same conditions, the smaller
firms in the sample borrow relatively more from banks. Again, restrictions on the banks'
ownership of restricted non-financial corporations is associated with more short-term debt
relative to accounts payable, but greater reliance on accounts payable and receivable.
28Of the control variables, the relation between profitability and the use of trade and bank
debt remains unchanged, and consistent with the previous results of Demirgiiu-Kunt  and
Maksimovic (1999) and Booth, Aivazian, Demirgui,-Kunt  and Maksimovic (2001). The other
coefficients of the remaining control variables are consistent with the results reported in Table
III.
In sum, the use of a two-stage procedure to address the endogenous nature of a country's
financial system does not change our findings in any material way.
7.0 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we argue that non-financial firms act as intermediaries channeling short-
term funds from the financial institutions in an economy to the their greatest use. Non-financial
firms act in this way because they may have a comparative advantage in exploiting informal
means of ensuring that their borrowers to repay. This comparative advantage may arise because
the lending firms are better informed about their customers' situation (as discussed by Biais and
Gollier 1997, and Frank and Maksimovic 1998), because they can take advantage of product
market imperfections (Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner 1988), because in some cases the
supplier incurs lower adverse selection costs in the financial markets (Frank and Maksimovic
1998), or because they can withhold supplies from their customers.
These considerations suggest that to optimally exploit their advantage in providing trade
credit to some classes of borrowers, firms should, when this is efficient, obtain external financing
from financial intermediaries and markets. Thus, the existence of a large banking system is
consistent with these considerations.
29Our empirical results show that firms in countries with large banking systems borrow
more on credit from their suppliers and lend more to their customers. These results are
particularly pronounced when the banking system has a low proportion of public ownership, and
is therefore likely to be commercially efficient.
There is less reliance on trade credit when the country's legal system is efficient. This
may occur because the comparative advantage of non-financial firms as intermediaries is likely
to be smaller when there exist efficient formal mechanisms for extracting payment. Interestingly,
in countries where there exist restrictions on banks' ability to hold ownership stakes in their
borrowers, firms rely on trade credit.
Taken together, our results suggest that the development of informal credit arrangements
between firms is complementary with the development of banking system that responds to
commercial incentives, especially in countries in which the legal system is not efficient. Since
the efficiency of a country's legal system is difficult to affect by policy means in the short-run,
these results point to the importance of promoting the development of trade credit, even among
the larger corporations in an economy.
Given trade credit is one of the important sources of financing for smaller firnis,
understanding  determinants of trade credit and how it is related to the development of the
financial system and the legal system also has important policy implications for the design of
small and medium enterprise (SME) financing programs. Development institutions generally
focus on helping local banks and financial intermediaries to provide financing to SMEs through
directed credit programs -which has not been all that successful in the past.  So one potential
result of this work could be that perhaps large firms have a role to play in intermediating funds to
smaller firms.
30Several puzzling results remain, in particular regarding the role of the banking sector
restrictions on the relative short-term borrowing by firms from financial intermediaries  and their
own suppliers. In particular, such restrictions lead to relatively more short-term  borrowing from
banks. Part of the explanation may be that in countries with banking restrictions, banks may
substitute short-term for long-term financing, confounding our results. Similarly, in countries
with efficient legal systems lenders may be willing to lend long-term, rather than providing
relatively more short-term credit. Both of these interpretations are consistent with Demirgu,c-
Kunt and Maksimovic (1999).
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Figure 3.  Short Term Debt to Accounts Payable.  The figure presents the average short term debt to accounts payable
ratios for firms in each country for 1989-1996. The countries are ordered by the value of the ratio.
36Table I
Legal and Financial Indicators
GDP/CAP  is the real  GDP  per  capita  in  1990  US$.  INFLATION  is the inflation rate of the GDP deflator. INFLATION  is the
inflation rate of the GDP deflator. S. PRIVATE/GDP is bank credit extended to the private sector divided by GDP. PUBLIC is percentage of
assets of the 10 largest banks in each country owned by the government as a share of total assets of these banks. CONCENTRATION  is the ratio
of the three largest banks'  assets to total banking sector assets.  REST measures the ability of banks to own and control nonfinancial firms,
calculated as in index in which I indicates "unrestricted," 2 indicates "permitted," 3 indicates "restricted,"  and 4 indicates "prohibited." LAW &
ORDER, scored I to 6, is an indicator of the degree to which citizens of a country are able to utilize the existing legal system to mediate disputes
and enforce contracts.  Law  and order  indicator,  produced  by  Intemational  Country  Risk rating  agency,  reflects  the degree  to which
the citizens of a country are willing  to accept the established  institutions  to make  and  implement  laws and adjudicate  disputes.  It is
scored  0-6 with  higher  scores  indicating  sound  political  institutions  and a strong  court system.  Lower  scores  indicate  a tradition  of
depending  on physical  force or illegal means  to settle claims.  Conmmon Law Dunmmy takes the value  one for common  law countries
and the value zero  for others.  Values  are 1989-96 averages  where time-series  observations  are available.
GDP/CAP  INF  PRVATE  PUBLIC  CONCENT.  REST.  LAW &  COMMON
(US S)  /GDP  ORDER  LAW
DUMMMY
Argentina  3536  1.15  0.14  0.31  0.57  3  3.56  0
Australia  13627  0.04  0.65  0.00  0.67  2  6.00  1
Austria  17342  0.03  0.91  0.04  0.72  1  6.00  0
Belgium  16022  0.03  0.50  0.00  0.62  3  6.00  0
Brazil  2012  2.34  0.22  0.51  0.68  3  3.75  0
Canada  16149  0.03  0.53  0.00  0.58  3  6.00  1
Chile  2169  0.15  0.42  0.24  0.49  3  4.19  0
Colombia  1306  0.23  0.15  0.19  0.46  4  1.19  0
Denmark  21182  0.02  0.41  0.00  0.75  2  6.00  0
Finland  18223  0.03  0.83  0.41  0.86  1  6.00  0
France  17505  0.03  0.91  0.15  0.41  2  5.50  0
Germany  17403  0.03  0.90  0.43  0.44  1  5.75  0
Greece  5153  0.14  0.17  0.63  0.77  1  4.25  0
Hong Kong  9690  0.09  1.36  0.00  0.80  3  4.68  1
India  393  0.09  0.25  0.42  0.42  4  2.50  1
Indonesia  603  0.08  0.44  0.80  0.43  2  3.00  0
Ireland  11480  0.03  0.29  0.00  0.79  1  5.00  1
Israel  10088  0.11  0.61  . 0.80  1  3.31  1
Italy  14727  0.05  0.52  0.25  0.36  3  5.00  0
Japan  23372  0.02  1.17  0.00  0.21  3  5.44  0
Korea  4586  0.06  0.50  0.00  0.33  3  3.68  0
Malaysia  2614  0.04  0.68  0.10  0.54  2  3.68  1
Mexico  1800  0.18  0.21  0.42  0.59  3  3.00  0
Netherlands  16568  0.02  0.85  0.00  0.73  1  6.00  0
New Zealand  11226  0.03  0.68  0.00  0.77  2  6.00  1
Norway  21139  0.03  0.58  0.38  0.85  2  6.00  0
Pakistan  302  0.11  0.23  0.50  0.76  1  1.88  1
Peru  834  1.07  0.07  0.00  0.72  2  1.69  0
Philippines  603  0.10  0.23  0.20  0.46  3  2.13  0
Portugal  4619  0.08  0.52  0.17  0.45  2  5.18  0
S. Africa  2230  0.11  0.57  0.00  0.78  1  2.69  1
Singapore  11180  0.03  0.79  . 0.73  3  5.19  1
Spain  9323  0.05  0.68  0.02  0.46  1  4.98  0
Sweden  19436  0.05  0.49  0.00  0.89  3  6.00  0
Switzerland  27157  0.03  1.63  0.15  0.74  3  6.00  0
Thailand  1473  0.05  0.68  0.29  0.54  3  4.31  1
Turkey  1565  0.55  0.12  0.37  0.45  3  3.19  0
U.K.  12883  0.05  1.11  0.00  0.58  1  5.31  1
U.S.  19772  0.04  0.66  0.00  0.18  3  6.00  1
37Table II
Summary  Statistics and Correlations
Summary statistics and correlations are presented in  Panel A and B  of the table, respectively.  N refers to  finn  level
observations for 40 countries over the 1989-1996  period.  The variables are defined as follows: RECTURN, receivables turiover,  is
given by total sales divided by accounts receivable. PAYTURN,  payables tumover is given by the total cost of goods sold div ded by
accounts payable. NSNFA is the net sales divided by net fixed assets. ROE is return on earnings. SIZE is firm size given by total assets
divided by GDP. GROWTH is the growth rate of the real GDP per capital. INFLATION is the inflation rate of the GDP deflator.
GDP/CAP is real GDP per capita in thousands of US$. PRIVATE/GDP is bank credit extended to the private sector divided by  GDP.
PUBLIC is percentage of assets of the 10 largest banks in each country owned by the govemment as a share of total assets c,f these
banks. CONCENTRATION is the ratio of the three largest banks' assets to total banking sector assets.  REST measures the ability of
banks to own and control nonfinancial finns, calculated as in index in which I indicates "unrestricted," 2 indicates "permiuted," 3
indicates "restricted,"  and 4 indicates "prohibited."  LAW & ORDER, scored I to 6, is an indicator of the degree to which citizens of a
country are able to utilize the existing legal system to mediate disputes and enforce contracts.  CREDITOR RIGHTS is an incex that
ranges from 0 to 4 and aggregates creditor rights in the following way: (1) the country imposes restrictions, such as creditors' :onsent
or  minimum dividends  to  file  for  reorganization; (2)  secured creditors are  able  to  gain  possession  of  their security  once  the
reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds
that result from the disposition of assets of a bankrupt firm; and (4) the debtor does not retain the administration of its property pending
the resolution of the reorganization. COMMON- LAW DUMMY takes the value 1 for common law countries and the value 2ero for
others. Detailed variable  definitions and sources are given in the appendix.
Panel A: Summary Statistics
N  Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum
RECTURN  27058  5.731  3.681  0.018  39.761
PAYTURN  27058  8.367  5.561  0.001  39.991
RATIO
NSNFA  26949  5.165  22.685  0.007  2498.641
ROE  26461  0.067  0.162  -1.000  0.986
SIZE  26953  1.62 x l06  7.70 x 10-6  1.28 x 10-'°  .00045
GROWTH  26829  0.016  0.042  -0.688  0.320
INFLATION  27050  0.059  0.231  -0.001  3.555
GDP/CAP  26829  16.971  6.840  0.242  27.828
PRIVATE/GDP  26947  0.846  0.317  0.030  1.672
PUBLIC  26648  0.091  0.167  0  0.800
CONCENTRATION  25204  0.386  0.218  0.155  1
RESTRICTIONS  26855  2.417  0.882  1  4
LAW & ORDER
CREDITOR RIGHTS  26996  2.019  1.171  0  4
COMMON LAW DUMMY  27058  0.424  0.494  0  1
38Panel B: Correlation Matrix of Variables
RECTURN  PAYTURN  RATIO  GDP/  GROWTH  INFL.  LAW &  PRIVATE/  COMMON  CREDITOR  REST  CONCENT  PUBLIC  SIZE  ROE
CAP  ORDER  GDP  RIGHTS
PAYTURN  .501'
RATIO  -.125'  .123'
GDP/CAP  -.097'  -.188'  -.148'
GROWTH  -.078-  -.0372  .053'  -.155'
INFI.  .144'  .122'  .072 '  -.295'  -.027'
LAW ORD  .073'  .036'  -.195'  .785'  -.193'  -.261'
PRIV/GDP  -.173'  -.113'  -.013'  .586'  -.113'  -.249'  .335'
COMMON  .268'  -.007  -.195'  -.263'  -.007'  -.059'  .027'  -.290'
CRED.  -.011'  -.079'  .087'  -.392'  .079'  -.050'  -.383'  .169'  .149'
RTS.
REST.  -.092'  .135'  .019'  .256'  .135'  .047'  -.052'  -.151'  -.003  -.414'
CONC  .078'  -.067a  .111'  -.452'  -.067'  .157'  -.192'  -.132'  -.045'  .334'  -.572'
PUJBLIC  .058'  *012b  .165  -.490'  .0 12'  .268'  -.443'  -.344'  -.268'  .138'  -.232'  .306'
SIZE  .020'  .022'  .086'  -.081'  .018'  .034'  -.034'  -.046'  -.069'  _ 013 b  -.048'  .204'  .077'
ROE  .168'  .128'  -.138'  -.138'  .050'  -.004  -.095'  -.084'  .110'  .093'  -.074'  .083'  .052'  .024'
NSNFA  .031'  .040'  -.041'  .016'  *.019'  - 014 b  .034'  _0 13b  .008  _0 13b  -.025'  -.007  .020'  -.021'  .025'
a  D and'  stand for significance levels at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.
39Table III
Determinants of Trade Credit
Panel A: Receivables Turnover.  The regression equation estimated is: RECTURN = V + 3,  NSNFA +  l2 ROE
+33 SIZE +34GROWTH + 35 IFLATION  + 36GDP/CAP - 37  PRIVATE/GDP + 38  PUBLIC + 39CONCENTRATION + 31 ,  REST+
3,, LAW & ORDER + 312 CREDITOR RIGHTS  +313 COMMON-LAW DUMMY +,.  Dependent variable, RECTURN, rec:.ivables
turnover is the total sales divided by accounts receivable. NSNFA is the net sales divided by net fixed assets. ROE is rtturn  on
earnings. SIZE is firm size given by  total assets divided by  GDP. GROWTH is  the growth rate of the real  GDP peT capital.
INFLATION  is the inflation rate of the GDP deflator. GDP/CAP is real GDP per capita in thousands of US$. PRIVATE/GDP  is bank
credit extended to the private sector divided by GDP. PUBLIC is percentage of assets of the 10 largest banks in each countr\ owned
by the govemment as a share of total assets of these banks. CONCENTRATION  is the ratio of the three largest banks' assets to total
banking sector assets.  REST measures the ability of banks to own and control nonfinancial firms, calculated as in index in  shich I
indicates "unrestricted," 2 indicates "permitted," 3 indicates "restricted,"  and 4 indicates "prohibited." LAW & ORDER, scored I to
6, is an indicator of the degree to which citizens of a country are able to utilize the existing legal system to mediate dispL,tes  and
enforce contracts.  CREDITOR RIGHTS is an index that ranges from 0 to 4 and aggregates creditor rights in the followhing  way: (1)
the country imposes restrictions, such as creditors' consent or minimum dividends to file for reorginization; (2) secured cred tors are
able to gain possession of their security once the reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) secured creditors
are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of assets of a bankrupt firm; and (4) the debl  or does
not retain the administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization. COMMON- ILAW  DUMMY takes the value
I for common law countries and the value zero foT others. First tvo  columns report large firM results and the last two srnall firmn
results. Large vs. small split is based on the median value of firm sales.  For each group the first regressions are estimated using firmn
level pooled data over the 1989-1996period using firm and yearrandom effects. Log transformaton of the dependent variable is taken
in all specifications. Specifications (2) and (4) are estimated using cross-sectional firm level data averaged over the sampl- period.
Standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix.
Large Firms  Smnall  Firms
(1)  (2)  (3)  (Z4
NSNFA  001***  o000  °000  .09
(.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.010  D)
ROE  .201***  .597***  .276***  .577x**
(.015)  (.072)  (.015)  (.056)
SIZE  .000  .003**  .091***  .16(,-**
(.001)  (.001)  (.018)  (.024)
GROWTH  -.143***  -2.723***  -.029  -2.077***
(.044)  (.384)  (.053)  (.3:29)
INFLATION  .274***  .367***  .277***  .33'**
(.016)  (.044)  (.021)  (.042)
GDP/CAP  .012***  -.000  008***  .0 I  #*
(.002)  (-004)  (.003)  (.004)
Banking variables:
PRIVATE/GDP  -.330***  -.255***  -.269***  -.251***
(.030)  (.045)  (.034)  (.048)
PUBLIC  .291***  .196***  .435***  .430 **
(.066)  (.067)  (.068)  (.073)
CONCENTRATION  .058**  -.143**  .000  -.0t 6
(.026)  (.062)  (.031)  (.064)
REST.  -.080***  -.051  *  **  -.063***  -.046 **
(.013)  (.016)  (.013)  (.01  6)
Legal variables:
LAW & ORDER  .043***  .087***  .087***  .084-**
(.017)  (.022)  (0.18)  (.0:23)
CREDITOR  -.022**  -.008  .005  .022**
RIGHTS  (.010)  (.010)  (.010)  (.011)
COMMON-LAW  .320***  .254***  .303***  .303-**
DUMMY  (.022)  (.025)  (.023)  (.026)
R
2 .19  .20  .18  .11
No. of firms  2,935  2,939  2,957  2,9r2
No. of Observations  12,465  2,939  11,482  2,9r62
*, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10,  5 and 1  percent respectively.Panel B: Payables Turnover.  The regression equation estimated is: PAYTURN = V +  31 NSNFA  +  32 ROE +33
SIZE +34GROWTH + 35 INFLATION + 36GDP/CAP  + 37PRIVATE/GDP  + 38 PUBLIC + 39  CONCENTRATION+ 31o  REST+ 3B,
LAW & ORDER + 31 2 CREDITOR RIGHTS + 31 3 COMMON-LAW  DUMMY +  . Dependent variable, PAYTURN, payables
tumover is the total costs of goods sold divided by accounts payable. NSNFA is the net sales divided by net fixed assets. ROE is
return on earnings. SIZE is firm size given by total assets divided by GDP. GROWTH is the growth rate of the real GDP per capital.
INFLATION  is the inflation rate of the GDP deflator. GDP/CAP is real GDP per capita in thousands of US$. PRIVATE/GDP  is bank
credit extended to the private sector divided by GDP. PUBLIC is percentage of assets of the 10 largest banks in each country owned
by the government as a share of total assets of these banks. CONCENTRATION  is the ratio of the three largest banks' assets to total
banking sector assets.  REST measures the ability of banks to own and control nonfinancial firms, calculated as in index in which I
indicates "unrestricted," 2 indicates "permitted," 3 indicates "restricted," and 4 indicates "prohibited." LAW & ORDER, scored I to
6, is an indicator of the degree to which citizens of a country are able to utilize the existing legal system to mediate disputes and
enforce contracts.  CREDITOR RIGHTS is an index that ranges from 0 to 4 and aggregates creditor rights in the following way: (1)
the country imposes restrictions, such as creditors' consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganization; (2) secured creditors are
able to gain possession of their security once the reorganization petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) secured creditors
are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of assets of a bankrupt firm; and (4) the debtor does
not retain the administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization. COMMON- LAW DUMMY takes the value
I for common law countries and the value zero for others. First two columns report large firm results and the last two small firm
results. Large vs. small split is based on the median value of firm sales.  For each group the first regressions are estimated using firm
level pooled data over the 1989-1996  period using firm and year random effects. Log transformation of the dependent variable is taken
in all specifications. Specifications (2) and (4) are estimated using cross-sectional firm level data averaged over the sample period.
Standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix.
Large Firms  Small Fiins
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
NSNFA  .002***  .Otl***  .000*  .000
(.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)
ROE  .041**  .321  ***  .162***  .843***
(.019)  (.079)  (.019)  (.066)
SIZE  .001  .002  .095***  .164***
(.001)  (.001)  (.022)  (.029)
GROWTH  -.094*  .248  -.224***  -1.325***
(.057)  (.424)  (.068)  (.385)
INFLATION  .181***  .275***  .165***  .207***
(.021)  (.049)  (.026)  (.049)
GDP/CAP  -.015***  -.011***  -.009***  -.004
(.002)  (.004)  (.003)  (.004)
Banking variables:
PRIVATE/GDP  -.319***  -.408***  -.328***  -.476***
(.036)  (.049)  (.042)  (.056)
PUBLIC  .507***  .430***  .770***  .664***
(.073)  (.074)  (.081)  (.082)
CONCENTRATION  -.080** *  .014  .020  .080
(.033)  (.068)  (.039)  (.076)
REST.  -.078***  -.076***  -.057***  -.045**
(.014)  (.018)  (.016)  (.019)
Legal variables:
LAW & ORDER  .181**  .189***  .184***  .187***
(.019)  (.025)  (.022)  (.027)
CREDITOR  -.024**  -.017  -.022*  .003
RIGHTS  (.011)  (.012)  (.012)  (.013)
COMMON-LAW  .224***  .206***  .184***  .158***
DUMMY  (.024)  (.028)  (.028)  (.031)
R
2 .23  .21  .22  .22
No. of firms  2,935  2,939  2,957  2,962
No. of Observations  12,465  2,939  11,482  2,962
*, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.Panel  C:  Short  Term  Debt  to Accounts  Payable.  The regression equation estimated  is  RATIO-  V+  3,
NSNFA  t  2  ROE  -33  SIZE  +34GROWTH +  35 INFLATION +  36GDP/CAP +  37 PRIVATE/GDP +  38 PUBLIC +  39
CONCENTRATION + 9,o REST+ 31B  LAW &  ORDER +  312  CREDITOR RlGHTS  +  313  COMMON-LAW  DUNlMY  +  ,.
Dependent variable RATIO is the ratio of short term debt to accounts payable.  NSNFA is the net sales divided by net fixed assets.
ROE is return on eamings. SIZE is firm size given by total assets divided by GDP. GROWTH is the growth rate of the real GDP per
capital. INFLATION  is the inflation rate of the GDP deflator. GDP/CAP is real GDP per capita in thousands of US$. PRIVATE/GDP
is bank credit extended to the private sector divided by GDP. PUBLIC is percentage of assets of the 10 largest banks in each country
owned by the govemment as a share of total assets of these banks. CONCENTRATION  is the ratio of the three largest banks' assets to
total banking sector assets. REST measures the ability of banks to own and control nonfinancial fimis, calculated as in index in which
I indicates "unrestricted," 2 indicates "permitted," 3 indicates "restricted,"  and 4 indicates "prohibited." LAW & ORDER, scored I
to 6, is an indicator of the degree to which citizens of a country are able to utilize the existing legal system to mediate disputes and
enforce contracts.  CREDITOR RIGHTS is an index that ranges from 0 to 4 and aggregates creditor rights in the following way: (1)
the country imposes restrictions, such as creditors' consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganization; (2) secured crelitors are
able to gain possession of their security once the reorganization petion  has been approved (no automatic stay); (3) secured creditors
are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of assets of a bankrupt firm; and (4) the de  3tor does
not retain the administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization. COMMON- LAW DUMMY takes the value
I for common law countries and the value zero for others. For each group the first regressions are estimated using firm level pooled
data  over the  1989-1996 period using firm and year random effects. Log transformation of the dependent variable is taken in all
specifications. Specifications (2) and (4) are estimated using cross-sectonal firm level data averaged over the sample period.  Standard
errors are given in parentheses. Detailed vanable definitions and sources are given in the appendix.
Large Firms  Small Firms
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
NSNTA  -.001  .000  -.00 I  -.001
(.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.00(  )
ROE  -.847***  -1 837***  -.861***  -1.567***
(.071)  (.206)  (.067)  (.15:5)
SIZE  .020***  .017***  .259***  .165***
(.003)  (.003)  (.059)  (.061)
GROWTH  -.755***  2.685***  -.395*  .788
(.218)  (1.089)  (.248)  (1.0'6)
INFLATION  -.147**  -.015  1.  92***  - 21'7**
(.018)  (.124)  (.079)  (.114)
GDP/CAP  -.082***  -.069***  .051***  -.051
(.007)  (.011)  (.008)  (.01  )
Banking  variables:
PRIVATE/GDP  .660***  .530***  .459***  .382***
(.105)  (.126)  (.112)  (.l-.)
PUBLIC  .166  .205  .700***  .641***
(.188)  (.190)  (.191)  (.19.)
CONCENTRATION  .183*  .463***  .355***  .384**
(.112)  (.175)  (.122)  (.177)
REST.  .324***  .275***  .267***  .226***
(.038)  (.045)  (.039)  (.04:;)
Legal  variables:
LAW  & ORDER  .123**  .100*  .065  .032
(.054)  (.063)  (.056)  (.063)
CREDITOR  .073***  .067**  .135***  .130***
RIGHTS  (.028)  (.029)  (.029)  (.03 ))
COMMON-LAW  -.736***  -.634***  -.658***  -.643,-**
DUMMY  (.064)  (.071)  (.068)  (.072)
R  2  .13  .17  .12  .17
No. of firms  2,870  2,879  2,798  2,8C8
No. of Observations  11,902  2,879  10,326  2,8C8
*, ** and *** indicate  significance  levels  of 10, 5 and  1 percent  respectively.Table IV
Sensitivity Analysis
The regression equation estimated is: D= V +  31 NSNFA + 32 ROE +33  SIZE +3 4GROWTH +  35  INFLATION +  36GDP/CAP  + 37
PRIVATE/GDP + 3s PUBLIC + 39 CONCENTRATION + 3 l  REST+ 31, LAW & ORDER + 312 CREDITOR RIGHTS + 313
COMMON-LAW DUMMY + ,.  Dependent variable, D, is RECTURN, receivables tumover,  PAYTURN, payables tumover, or
RATIO, respectively in the three regressions reported in each panel. Log transformations of all dependent variables are taken. NSNFA
is  the net  sales divided by net  fixed assets. ROE is return on eamings. SIZE is  firm size given by total  assets divided by GDP.
GROWTH is the growth  rate of the real GDP per capital. INFLATION  is the inflation rate of the GDP deflator. GDP/CAP is real GDP
per capita in thousands of US$. PRIVATE/GDP is bank credit extended to the private sector divided by GDP. PUBLIC is percentage  of
assets of the 10 largest banks in each country owned by the govemment as a share of total assets of these banks. CONCENTRATION  is
the ratio of the three largest banks'  assets to total banking sector assets.  REST measures the ability of banks to  own and control
nonfinancial firms, calculated as in index in which I indicates "unrestricted," 2 indicates "permitted," 3 indicates "restricted,"  and 4
indicates "prohibited." LAW & ORDER, scored I to 6, is an indicator of the  degree to which citizens of a country are able to utilize the
existing  legal system to mediate  disputes and enforce contracts.  CREDITOR RIGHTS is  an index that  ranges from 0 to  4 and
aggregates creditor rights in the following way: (1) the country imposes restrictions, such as creditors' consent or minimum dividends
to file for reorganization; (2) secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the reorganization petition has been
approved (no automatic stay); (3) secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of
assets of  a  bankrupt firm;  and (4)  the  debtor does not  retain  the  administration of  its property  pending  the resolution of  the
reorganization. COMMON- LAW  DUMMY takes the value  1  for common law countries and the value  zero for  others. In the
regressions  PRIVATE/GDP is  replaced  by  its  predicted  value  from the  regression PRIVATE/GDP= V  +  31GROWTH +  32
INFLATION + 33 GDP/CAP + 34 LAW & ORDER + 3s CREDITOR RIGHTS + 36  COMMON-LAW DUMMY +,  .The regressions
are estimated --for large and small firms separately --using firm level pooled data over the 1989-1996  period with firmn  and year random
effects.  Large vs. small split is based on the median value of firm sales. Log transformation of the dependent variable is taken in all
specifications. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix.
PANEL A: Large Firms
RECTURN  PAYTURN  RATIO
NSNFA  .002***  .002***  -.001
(.000)  (.000)  (.001)
ROE  .207***  .047***  -.971***
(.015)  (.019)  (.071)
SIZE  .000  .000  .021***
(.001)  (.001)  (.003)
GROWTH  -.154***  -.096*  -.745**
(.045)  (.058)  (.217)
INFLATION  .221***  .131***  -.025
(.018)  (.023)  (.077)
GDP/CAP  .031***  .001  115***
(.004)  (.004)  (.013)
Banking variables:
PRIVATE/GDP  -.929***  -.922***  2.163***
(.148)  (.164)  (.416)
PUBLIC  477***  .672***  -.127
(.064)  (.071)  (.182)
CONCENTRATION  .089***  -.052*  .099
(.026)  (.033)  (.112)
REST.  -.063***  -.058***  .265***
(.013)  (.014)  (.037)
Legal variables:
LAW & ORDER  .042***  .190***  .056
(.016)  (.018)  (.051)
COMMON-LAW  .386***  .278***  -.817***
DUMMY  (.021)  (.023)  (.062)
R  2  .17  .21  .13
No. of firms  2,923  2,923  2,870
No. of Observations  12,430  12,430  11,943
*, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.PANEL  B: Small  Firms
RECTURN  PAYTURN  RATIO
NSNFA.000  . 000*°°  °.001**
(.000)  (.000)  (.001)
ROE  .279***  .166***  -.874***
(.015)  (.019)  (.067)
SIZE  .101***  .110***  .268***
(.018)  (.022)  (.058)
GROWTH  -.005  -.228***  -.364
(.054)  (.069)  (.247)
INFLATION  .252***  .109***  -.029
(.023)  (.028)  (.085)
GDP/CAP  .014***  .007  -13*
(.005)  (.005)  (.013)
Banking variables:
PRIVATE/GDP  -.403***  -.935***  2.788**'
(.152)  (.181)  (.419)
PUBLIC  .579***  .949***  .483***9
(.066)  (.079)  (.183)
CONCENTRATION  .030  .046  .290***
(.031)  (.039)  (.121)
REST.  (.048**3  .036**  .218***
(.013)  (.016)  (.038)
Legal variables:
LAW & ORDER  .082***  .192***  -.031
(.017)  (.021)  (.052)
COMMON-LAW  .359***  .242***  .689
DUMMY  (.022)  (.027)  (.065)
R
2 .17  .20  .12
No. of firms  2,948  2,948  2,800
No. of Observations  11,421  11,421  10,364
*, -* and ***  indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and I percent respectively.Variable Definitions and Sources
CONCENTRATION:  The ratio of the three largest banks' assets to total banking sector assets, Growth
rate of real per capita GDP, average over 1990-97  period and using data from
Beck, Demirgiiu-Kunt,  and Levine (1999)
PUBLIC:  Percentage of assets of the 10 largest  banks in each country owned by the
government  as a share of total assets of these banks, calculated using data from
La Porta, Lopez-Silanes, and Schleifer (1999)
RESTRICTIONS  measures the ability of banks to own and control nonfinancial firms, calculated
as in index in which I indicates "unrestricted," 2 indicates "permiitted,"  3
indicates "restricted," and 4 indicates "prohibited." Obtained from Barth,
Caprio and Levine (1999).
PRIVATE/GDP  PRIVATE/GDP Demirgui,-Kunt  and Levine (2000).
LAW &ORDER  LAW & ORDER, scored I to 6, is an indicator of the degree to which citizens of
a country are able to utilize the existing legal system to mediate disputes and
enforce contracts.  Lower scores indicate a tradition of depending on physical
force or illegal means to settle claims. Higher scores indicate sound political
institutions and a strong court system. It is produced by the International
Country Risk Rating Agency.
CREDITOR RIGHTS  is an index that ranges from 0 to 4 and aggregates creditor rights in the
following way: (1) the country imposes restrictions, such as creditors' consent or
minimum dividends to file for reorganization;  (2) secured creditors are able to
gain possession of their security once the reorganization petition has been
approved (no automatic stay); (3) secured creditors are ranked first in the
distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of assets of a
bankrupt firm; and (4) the debtor does not retain the administration of its
property pending the resolution of the reorganization. It is from Laporta, Lopez-
De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998).
COMMON LAW DUMMY  takes the value 1 for common law countries and the value zero for others. It is
based on the information in Laporta, Lopez-De-Silanes,  Shleifer and Vishny
(1998).
GROWTH  is the growth rate of the real GDP per capital.it is calculated as the  log
difference of GDP/CAP. Source: World Development Indicators (WDI)
GDP/CAP  is real GDP per capita in thousands of US$. Source: WDI
INFLATION  is the inflation rate of the GDP deflator. Source:  International Financial
Statistics (IFS)
The following firm-level variables are obtained from World Scope:
PAYTURN  payables turnover, given by the total cost of goods sold divided by the mean of
the accounts payable at the beginning and at the end of the period
RECTURN  receivables turnover, given by the total sales divided by the mean of the
accounts receivable at the beginning and at the end of the periodRATIO  is given by short-term debt divided by accounts payable.
NSNFA  net sales divided by net fixed assets
ROE  return on earnings
SIZE  firm size is given by total assets divided by GDP. Nominal GDP in local
currency is from IFS.
World Scope data were screened for potential data errors as follows: For each country we calculated  the 5th
and 95h percentile of the variables above. A firm was dropped if any of the variables was not in a int-rval around the
country's mean for that variable. The interval's value is siz times the difference  between the 95th  and 5"' percentile
values of the variable for the specific country.
The sample was trimmed for outliers. Firms were dropped if PAYTURN and RECTURN eyceeded 40, or
if RATIO exceeded 30. The sample 99h percentile values of the three variables are 44, 26, and 27, respectively.
The sample composition is given in Table Al. The  number of firms in the sample does not always equal  the
number  of observations  used to estimate the regressions. Firms are dropped from regressions  equations when a
required firm-level  or country-level  variable is missing. In addition,  a small number  of firms switches from being
classified  as "small" to being classified as "big," or vice-versa,  over the sample  period. Such firms appear  in both of the
size-classified  samples for the appropriate  period.Table Al
Sample Composition
The Table shows the comrposition  of firms remnaining  in the sample after the outliers were trinmmed.
(tAITNTRV  NFTMI4RFR (AIi  FI4RM4  CAnTNTrV  NTIMRI  nF  FlRMq
Argentina  1  4  Janan  1164
Australia  50  Korea  143
Austria  53  Malaysia  136
Belgium  43  Mexico  40
Brazil  86  Netherlands  89
Canada  151  New Zealand  15
Chile  30  Norway  45
Colombia  10  Pakistan  52
Denmark  84  Peru  16
Finland  57  Philippines  28
France  308  Portugal  33
Germany  326  S. Africa  55
Greece  52  Singapore  63
Hong Kong  99  Spain  56
India  252  Sweden  87
Indonesia  67  Switzerland  89
Ireland  12  Thailand  109
Israel  20  Turkey  32
Italy  110  U.K.  547
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